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Introductory note 
In preparing this interim report your Rap-
porteur has drawn on the proceedings of the 
symposium on a European armaments policy 
which the Committee organised in Paris on 
3rd and 4th March 1977. He gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance in the preparation 
of the report provided by 1\fr. John Wilkinson, 
Assistant to the Chairman of British Aircraft 
1. Adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Membera of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; 
MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrena, 
Beauguitte, Bizet, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Foaaon, 
Grant, Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster (Alternate : 
I 
Corporation, who was appointed by the Clerk as 
an outside expert, at the request of the Rap-
porteur. 
The Committee intends to prepare a further 
report, incorporating the results of further 
enquiries, for submission to the second part of 
the twenty-third session of the ABsembly on 
28th November 1977. 
Piket), Lemmrich (Alternate:: Schetfier), Maggioni, Menard, 
Pawelczyk (Alternate: Lemp), Pecchioli (Alternate: 
Calamandrei), Ri!Mre, Roberti (Alternate: Pecoraro), 
Roper, Scholten, Schu.gena, Schmidt, Tanghe, Whitehead. 
N. B. The namea of thoae taking part in the tJote are 
printed in italica. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on a European armament. policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) While wishing for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments in Europe, believing that the 
increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems makes it urgent and imperative for the European 
countries of the Alliance to secure the economic and military advantages of standardisation through joint 
production ; 
(ii) · Noting 
(a) that the proliferation of equipment types reduces the operational capacity and the cost effectiveness 
of the defence of Western Europe ; 
(b) that the growing complexity of modern weapons systems causes a. large increase in equipment 
costs; 
(iii) Considering the inherent political dangers of any armaments industry which relies on exports to 
third world countries or areas of conflict ; 
(iv) Welcoming recent indications that the United States will increasingly seek standardisation of equip-
ment in the Alliance ; 
(v) Stressing the need for satisfactory parliamentary control both at European as well as at a national 
level of the defence procurement process, and resolving itself to play a rl>le until the European Parliament 
is invested by statute with defence functions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments, severally and jointly in all appropriate bodies, to pursue the following 
objectives : 
I. Ensure the maintenance of a viable defence production industry in Europe taking account of the 
needs of national defence plans and of the Alliance : 
(a) by giving first priority to the joint production of standardised equipment in Europe while ensuring 
the interoperability of existing equipment throughout the Alliance ; 
(b) by pursuing secondly further standardisation in the Alliance as a. whole; 
2. Streamline the institutional basis of joint production : 
(a) by concentrating on the independent European programme group ; 
(b) by ensuring that military characteristics of equipment are determined within NATO; 
3. Inform the Assembly accurately and fully of the nature and extent of the terms of re~erence given 
to the Standing Armaments Committee on 26th April 1977. 
2 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee organised a symposium on 
a European armaments policy in Paris on 3rd 
and 4th March 1977 1• This report will analyse 
the guiding concepts and principles which 
emerged. During the two days of the symposium 
a number of eminent experts read papers and 
discussions took place between parliamentarians, 
representatives of the armaments industries, of 
military procurement and headquarters staffs 
and of government departments about European 
armaments manufacture and procurement and 
the consequences of modern weapon technoLogy. 
2. As many speakers reminded the symposium, 
the need for co-operation in weapon procurement 
has been widely understood and repeatedly 
emphasised for over twenty-five years. However, 
in spite of limited progress towards greater 
standardisation of equipment and inter-
operabi-lity of weapon systems within the 
Alliance, proliferation of equipment types and 
incompatibilities of ammunition and supplies 
persist and even increase, degrading the opera-
tional capability and the cost effectiveness of 
the defence of Western Europe. Joint produc-
tion has been successful in a number of areas, 
but industrially this has tended to be an ad hoc 
process and fo; consequent collaborative arrange-
ments, joint companies and consortia have not 
UBUally been maintained once the programme in 
question has been completed. 
3. The need for co-operation in the weapon 
procurement field is based on three imperatives 
- financial, military and socio-economic. 
4. Recession and, as Mr. Greenwood 2 
reminded the symposium, the political 
unpopularity of high defence spending among 
the populations of Western Europe unused to 
war for over a generation, have squeezed defence 
budgets to the point where they are in many 
instances static in real terms. At the same time 
the increased complexity of modern weapons 
systems has caused a dramatic escalation in 
equipment costs. 
5. For example, as Ingenieur General 
Cauchie 1 explained, at constant prices and 
weight for weight, the cost of a tank has 
doubled and that of an aircraft has quadrupled 
over the past fifteen years. Inflationary pres-
sures have augmented manpower costs R~lso. 
1. See official record of the symposium. 
2. Chairman of British Aircraft Corporation. 
3. Directeur adjoint A la Direction des Affaires inter-
nationales, Delegation Generale pour l'Armement (France). 
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6. It is therefore in General Cauchie's words 
"economically essential to contain the unit costs 
of these modern systems by amortisation over 
long runs of the overhead costs of research, 
development and tooling". This is only possible 
through collaboration and joint weapon pro-
duction programmes. Fortunately in this respect 
military and financial considerations coincide. 
7. Militarily the benefits of collaboration in 
the procurement field are considerable. The 
benefits were assessed by General Major 
P. Dirix 1, in the following terms : "We believe 
tha.t co-operation in the research, development 
and production of armaments by preventing the 
proliferation of separate national projects might 
avoid wasteful duplication, encourage standard-
isation, and at the same time increase operational 
efficiency and reduce production and mainten-
ance costs". 
8. The military significance of low produetion 
costs was emphasised by General de Maiziere's 2 
advice that "it would be very unwise to equip 
them (the armed forces) for only one type of 
conflict because this type seemed the most prob-
able at a given time. In reality, types of warfare 
could change very quickly Rllld far more quickly 
than the armies themselves. They must therefore 
be equipped to meet various types of attack". 
Such a spectrum of capability - inherent in the 
strategy of flexible respo~ - is costly and 
enhances on military grounds the importance of 
collaborative weapon procurement. 
9. The other clear military benefits of co-
operation in this field are the twin operational 
advantages of standardisation and interopera-
bility: The first predicates the second but this 
did not preclude a marked divergence of expert 
opinion on these subjects at the symposium. 
10. On the one hand Ingenieur General Cauchie 
explained . in forthright terms his country's 
views that "whereas some of our partners swear 
by standardisation, we in France think that, if 
we have to operate together, our equipment has 
to be interoperable and we prefer to lay the main 
emphasis on interoperability. It is our belief", 
he continued, "that while standardisation may in 
one way offer the same advantages as inter-
operability ... it hRIS drawbacks at the operational, 
industrial, political and financial levels". 
11. On the other hR~Ud General de Maiziere 
argued the contrary case. He personally thought 
1. Assistant Chief of Staff, Belgian Land Forces, 
Chairman of the FINABEL Committee of Principal 
Military Experts. 
2. Former General Inspektor der Bundeswehr. 
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interoperability of only passing use and that it 
was more expensive than standardisatio';l· ~e, 
therefore, pleaded in favour of standardiSation 
at least where new weapon systems were con-
cerned. 
12. Finally, the economic grounds for co-
operation in the procuremoot field ~ere 
reiterated by many speakers at the symposium. 
In the words of :Mr. Edmond Nessler, President 
of the Assembly of W artern European Union, 
"the maintenance of our armaments industries 
remains essential for the domestic and social 
balance of our countries and for upholding our 
position in the world and safeguarding our inde-
pendooce. The armaments industries of most of 
our countries employ a large number of workers 
and make a major contribution to our exports; 
they are also instrumental in keep~ us i~ the 
civil and military industriaL race at mternational 
level". 
13. Most speakers saw co-operation in the 
military field as being the only way for Western 
European nations to avoid -. in ~~an 
Critchley's 1 graphic phrase - either bemg 
disarmed by inflation" or being forced to become 
wholly reliant upon the Unitoo States of America, 
both for our defence and for our industrial well-
being. As Mr. Greenwood warned the symposium, 
"that degree of domination would reduce our 
defence industries to the leveL of sub-
contractors". 
14. Dr. Ingenieur Gustavo Stefanini 2, 
explained that an armaments industry provides 
an appreciable contribution to national: wealt~, 
especially in terms of export revenue. In thiS 
connection Mr. Nessler's observation that the 
French armaments industry exports some 30 % 
of its production was noteworthy. Arms manu-
facture employs a highly skilled work-
force it acts as a motor for technological pro-
gress' with "spin off" into valuable civil applica-
tions and extends the range of the national 
economy into a field of industrial activity less 
susceptible to cyclical economic recessions and 
reduces the vulnerability of the economy to 
sootoral market crises. At the same time the 
Committee stresses the political dangers inherent 
in any armaments industry which is depoodent 
on exports to countries outSide the Alliance in 
order to amortise research, development and 
"start-up" costs, or to reduce the unit cost of 
production for national use. Foreign policy can 
be distorted as arms sales considerations come 
into play ; potential conflicts may be sparked off 
in unstable situations in the third world. 
I. Chairman, Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, and official Chairman of the symposium. 
2. Chairman of Oto Melara {Italy). 
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15. The Committee believes that together the 
European countries of the Alliance provide an 
arms market Large enough for economic produc-
tion that would be independent of exports to the 
third world thus enabling such exports to be 
terminated ~r limited to those deemed to be in 
the interest of Europe according to a commonly 
defined external policy 1 • At the present time, 
however, budgetary constraints have ~ded 
throughout Western Europe to lead ·to reductions 
in the appropriations earmarked for equipment. 
In this instance Mr. Nessler quoted the example 
of France whose expenditure on equipment was 
52.2 % of the defence budget in 1967 and has 
fallen to 41% in 1977, while the portion of the 
defence budget .earmarked for research has fallen 
from 8.9 % in 1971 to 6 % in 1976. Correspond-
ing figures for other countries show marked 
fluctuations but no particular trend. Thus the 
United States expenditure on research and 
development as a percentage of its defence 
budget ranged from 9.6 % in 1968 to 9.9 % in 
financial year 1978 ; its expenditure on procure-
ment ranged from 29.8 % in 1968 to 28.5 % in 
financial year 1978, with a low of 20.6 % in . 
1974. For Germany the total of research and 
development and procurement as a percentage 
of th€ defence budget ranged from 26.3 % in 
1970 to 25.2 % in 1976 with a low of 22.4 % in 
1971. In financial year 1977 the United King-
dom spent 12.4 % of its c:refence budget on 
research and development alone. 
16. Logic therefore has long encouraged indus-
~ trial co-operation in arms manufacture. !Wsearch 
and development costs can be shared and unit 
costs minimised through long production lines 
but the obstacles remain. A number of speakers 
alluded to them. 
17. Ingenieur General Cauchie warned against 
the aJarmingly monopolistic results which a 
d6 facto specialisation of industries or countries 
in arms manufacture could have. He preferred 
the parallel development of several comp~titive 
systems within Europe with the attendant mcen-
tive to im10vation and design capability. Like-
wise, Dr. Stefanini reminded the symposium that 
"the improved utilisation of military budgets 
should be conditioned by consideration of its 
collateral negative effects on the European 
industry as a whole". 
18. He pointed out that "in most economic 
sectors European co-operation had been 
implemented in the context of specifically-created 
institutions and according to clearly-defined 
regulations which, in varying measure, take 
account of the possible socio-economic con-
sequences of jointly-reached decisions and which. 
I. See speeches by Mr. Van Elslande, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to the Assembly on 5th December 
1974 and on 28th May I975. 
provide, where necessary, for corrective action 
or agreement on appropriate compromise". 
19. He feared that the IEPG working explic-ttly 
outside the EEC and also outside NATO "could 
prove to be a body with an outlook concentrated 
on military budgetary interests and relatively 
disinterested in other aspects". These socio-
economic difficulties of joint arms production 
and specialisation described by Dr. Stefanini llB 
problems of "human ecology" emphasise the 
importance of the initi-ative taken by the WEU 
Council in May 1976 when it decided to assign 
a study to the Standing Armaments Committee 1• 
I. Existing institutions 
A. Independent European programme group 
20. The independent European programme 
group (IEPG) originated from a decision taken 
by Eurogroup Ministers in speciaL session in 
November 1975 to seek to establish a new forum, 
in which France could participate, for collabora-
tion in defence procurement and the development 
of a common European position from which to 
begin a dialogue with the United States on 
defence equipment matters. 
21. .k!. a result of this decision, representatives 
of the Eurogroup nations (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Turkey and the United King-
dom) and France assembled in IWme for the 
first meeting of the IEPG on 2nd February 
1976. They resolved to work, in the spirit of the 
Alliance and without jeopardising national 
responsibilities, towards the aims of more 
effective use of funds for research, development 
and procurement, increased standardisation and 
interoperability of equipment, the maintenance 
of a healthy European defence industrial and 
technological base and the strengthening of the 
European factor in the relationship with the 
United States and Canada. 
22. Since its inception the IEPG has proceeded, 
under Italian chairmanship, in a flexible and 
pragmatic manner without setting up any 
permanent machinery. On 22nd and 23rd Novem-
ber 1976 the second plenary session of the IEPG 
took :place once again in Rome. The Italian 
chairmanship of the group was renewed since ; 
a:lthough it was felt that the system of annual 
rotation of chairmanship should be retained, it 
was preferable for Italy to continue its work of 
co-ordination and preparation for another year. 
There have been meetings at a. number of levels, 
including two at . "State Secretary" (Junior 
?lfinister/Permanent Secretary) level and two at 
national armaments director level. Meetings at 
I. See section C below. 
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official "expert" level have been more frequent. 
Initial progress has been made simultaneously on 
the harmonisation of nationaL equipment pro-
grammes, the examination of possible joint 
projects and the consideration of certain asp-ects 
of procedures and practices affecting collabora-
tive projects. Three panels were established to 
co-ordinate work as follows and their work was 
confirmed and approved by the second plenary 
session: 
(a) Panel I, under United Kingdom 
chairmanship, haB compiled and agreed 
a comprehensive schedule of equipment 
in service and replacement intentions. 
This is an essential base for the com-
parison of national needs and the 
formulation of joint plans, and goes 
beyond anything hitherto produced in 
other collaborative fora. The schedule 
will be updated at regular intervals. 
(b) Panel II, chaired by Belgium,· co-
ordinates the work of ten equipment 
sub-groups which have been set up to 
examine the opportunities for col-
·laboration in specific areas. Six of 
these sub-groups were established BB a 
result of comparison of national con-
tributions to the replacement schedule 
prepared by Panel I. 
(c) Panel III, the Defence Economics and 
Procedures Panel (DEPP), under 
German chairmanship, has identified 
and set up sub-groups to study five 
general areas : project procedures, 
arms exports, multi-project compensa-
tion, competition and industrial co-
operation. The panel has been author-
ised to use the results of the study 
assigned by the WEU Council to the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
When the IEPG's equipment sub-groups are 
further advanced in their deliberations, industry 
will of course need to be involved in the result-
ing pre-feasibHity studies 1• 
23. Until the formation of the IEPG, there 
had been no purely European forum for the 
discussion and production of equipment co-
operrution that WllB open to aU the European 
members of the Alliance and in which France 
participated. France has been unwilling to join 
or be associated with Eurogroup ; while the 
Standing Armaments Committee of Western 
European Union, which hllB not in any case been 
active as a forum for stimulating co-operaJtion, 
excludes the European :flank countries (Denmark, 
Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey). 
I. See paragraphs 85-97. 
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24. With the accession of Portugal in Novem-
ber 1976, the IEPG now includes all the Euro-
pean members of NATO who maintain armed 
forces, and its memoors have explicitly re-
affirmed their intention that it should continue 
to act as a principal European forum for col-
l<aboration in the defence equipment field. 
25. Nevertheless, this European context does 
not disregard the Atlantic framework. The 
resolution which established the group linked 
both aspects in a single vision. · 
26. AB Admira1 Mainini 1 reminded the 
symposium, the IEPG has not failed to study 
the question of relations with the Alliance, and 
has seen the Conference of Nationail. Armaments 
Directors as the appropriate forum for exchanges 
of views and experience. 
27. Admiral Mainini was insistent that 
aLthough the members of the IEPG have been 
preoccupied with their urgent problems of indus-
trial co-operation and of harmonising require-
ment time scales, they "have not neglected the 
wider consideration of relations with the coun-
tries on the other side of the Atlantic, particu-
larly since the United States is increasingly and 
practically disposed to envisage standardisation 
as an aim to be achieved through a more balanced 
exchange between the two components of the 
.Alliance". 
28. In its work to date the IEPG has done 
much to reconcile what Julian Critchley 
described as "the twin aims of the Alliance, 
standardisation and the preservation of Euro-
pean defence industries". However, Admiral 
Mainini's speech did not make clear precisely 
how much progress IEPG is making. The Com-
mittee would wish to know what new joint pro-
duction projects are to be embarked on, and 
what institutionilJ: arrangements are envisaged 
for joint production. It would Jike assurances 
that there is no deadlock in any area of the 
IEPG discussions. 
B. Eurogroup 
29. Eurogroup was established in 1968. Its 
members are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom. Created in 
order to further a greater identity of interest in 
defenee matters between the European members 
of the Alliance, it soon provided an impetus for 
European co-operation in equipment matters. It 
functions through the armaments experts on the 
national delegations to NATO in Brussels and 
has no secretariat of its own. 
1. Deputy Chief of the Italian Defence Staff, Chainnan 
of the independent European programme group at National 
Armaments Director level. 
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30. It has acted as an important ministerial 
forum for the Defence Ministers of the Euro-
pean NATO nations. 
31. Its sub-groups have been engaged for a 
number of years in the field of tactical harmon-
isation, armaments, training and logistic co-
operation 1• For exa~ple, in December 1972 the 
Defence Ministers of Eurogroup passed a 
"Declaration of principles" on equipment col-
laboration and in May 1975 the. Eurogroup 
Defence Ministers recommended a much more 
vigorous approach to standardisation through 
military trade between the United States and 
Europe which was endorsed at the NATO 
Defence Ministers' meeting. 
32. Nevertheless, in spite of the progress made 
and real achievements of Eurogroup to date, 
it has suffered from a fatal defect in that France 
did not participate. This has long been recognised 
by the Assembly and by the Committee 1• Atten-
tion was also drawn to this in Resolution 16 of 
the North Atlantic Assembly (October 1973) 
which noted that "France does not participate in 
the activities of the Eurogroup and that con-
sequently insufficient use is made of the consider-
able technological potential of the French arma-
ments industry and that furthermore this non-
participation will not facilitate a standardisa-
tion of armaments so frequently recommended 
with regard to European defence". 
33. The resolution urged Eurogroup and 
France to seek a solution to this problem. 
C. Standing Armaments Committee 
34. The Standing Armaments Committee was 
established by decision of the Council of Western 
European Union (7th 1\fay 1955) but is not 
actually referred to in the· Treaty of Brussels 
itself. 
35. "The Standing Armaments Committee shall, 
in close relation with the North At1antic Treaty 
Organisation, seek to improve consultation and 
co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a 
view to finding joint solutions which would 
assist governments of memoor countries in meet-
ing their equipment requirements. To that end 
it shall encourage, on a case by case basis, agree-
ments or arrangements on such subjects as the 
development, standardisation, production and 
procurement of armaments." 3 
1. Eurotraining - (Training) ; 
Euronad - (Equipment co-operation) ; 
Eurocom - (Battlefield communications); 
Eurolog - (Logistics); 
Eurolongtenn - (Agreement of basic tactics con-
cepts); 
Euromed - (Medical services). 
2. See e.g. Recommendation 269, 28th May 1975. 
3. Paragraph 10 of the decision. 
36. Staffed by an international secretariat, 
members of which also attend meetings of the 
NATO Conference of National Armaments 
Directors as observers, the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU meets four times a year in 
Paris. Representatives on the Standing Arma-
ments Committee are drawn from members' 
NATO delegations, usually at colonel or civilian 
official level, except in the case of the French 
and Italian representatives who are generals. 
37. The Standing Armaments Committee also 
maintains a close liaison with the NATO Mili-
tary Agency for Standardisation (MAS) and the 
FINABEL Committee of Principal Military 
Experts. 
38. Despite the hopes placed in it in its earlier 
years, the Standing Armaments Committee has 
not proved to be a framework within which joint 
production projects have been undertaken. But 
as Mr. Nessler rightly pointed out in his open-
ing speech at the symposium, the Council of 
WEU, in May 1976, took an important decision 
in assigning to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee a study of the armaments industries in 
member countries 1 • 
39. This decision, if followed up positively by 
the WEU Council on 26th April 1977, could 
1. Text of the mandate approved by the Council 
of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on 31st May 
1976 
1. The Standing A.rma.ments Committee is instructed to 
submit to the Permanent Council, before the end of 1976, 
a detailed outline programme for a study as set out in 
the Annex, and a description of its proposed method of 
work; 
2. The Permanent CowlCil will study carefully the outline 
programme and the proposed method of work submitted 
to them by the SAC, taking acconnt of the determination 
of governments to avoid all duplication and any encroach· 
ment on work in progress elsewhere. The aim of the 
Conncil's consideration of the SAC's outline programme 
will be to specify the terms and define the scope of the 
study to be assigned to it. They will take account, in 
particular, of the tasks undertaken by the European 
programme group at their meeting in the autwnn of 1976 ; 
3. The Permanent Council are authorised to take deci-
sions on the proposals thus submitted ; 
4. The Permanent Council will follow the development 
of the work and will report to Ministers at their next 
meeting; 
5. The Permanent Conncil have also been authorised to 
consider at a later stage the possibility of including the 
following points in the study : 
Inventory of capacitiu 
Here, the aim would be to identify, by main categories, 
the weak and strong points of the European industry, 
together with the sectors where it can compete on favour-
able terms. 
Inventory of relation~~ between indU8triu in diflerent 
European countriu 
At industrial level, there is already a network of 
contacts and various forms of occasional or systematic 
co.operation. These experiments should be analysed with 
a view to possible rationalisation on a European scale. 
7 
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restore a useful role to the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU which in the p.ast has been 
overshadowed by other organisations. 
D. FINABEL 
40. The FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee 
was set up in 1953 (i.e. before any other simila.r 
European body) by agreement of the chiefs of 
staff of the land forces of member countries 
approved by their J'rfinisters of Defence. Its 
permanent secretariat is located in the Belgian 
Ministry of Defence with a French colonel as 
secretary and a Belgian lieutenant-colonel as 
assistant secretary. 
41. It was at first composed of the representa-
tives of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, but was joined by representa-
tives of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 
and the United Kingdom in 1972 after Great 
Bri-tain's accession to the EEC. 
42. FINABEL is an international· association 
whose members are appointed by their respective 
governments. Its proposals are transmitted 
through them, i.e. through the chiefs of staff 
(army) to governments. FINABEL cannot 
negotiate as an entity with a government. 
43. The aim of FINABEL is to encourage 
military co-operation among the NATO member 
States whose defence concerns and requirements 
are comparable particularly in the following 
fields in respect of land armaments : 
- definition of qualitative requirements 
of military equipment and joint defini-
tion of the military characteristics of 
such equipment ; 
- joint testing of equipment and proced-
ure; 
Annex 
The Standing Armaments Committee, acting under 
the authority of the Council, is instructed to make a 
descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments 
industry in member countries. The purpose of this analysis 
is to gain a clearer insight into the industrial and economic 
implications of the standardisation of armaments. It shall 
be directed to formulating a diagnosis. 
(a) Definition of the armamenta aector 
The concept of arman1ents should be defined by 
distinguishing between armaments as such and the pro-
duction of goods and services for national defence. 
(b) Collection of economic data 
One purpose of the study will be to assemble figures 
showing the relative scale of armaments production in 
each of the countries and between them, and covering 
such points as amount of investment, research, sources 
of fnnds (public and private), manpow~r and exports 
(divided into the European, Atlantic and other areas). 
(c) Legal atatU8 of firma and domutic legialation 
The study should also identify the various legal statuses 
of arms firms. 
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- tactical and logistic studies ; 
- exchange of information. 
44. FINABEL's mandate does not cover the 
joint production of equipment since this is out-
side the responsibilities of chiefs of staff. Never-
theless, the joint positions set out in the agree-
ments on the military characteristics of land 
army equipment have a direct influence on its 
development. 
45. NATO recognises FINABEL as a regional 
group and the NATO Army Armaments Group 
(NAAG) of CNAD frequently uses FINABEL's 
work as a basis for its own studies. 
46. The WEU Standing Armaments Committee 
and FINABEI.J exchange documents and their 
_respective secretariats are in constant contact. 
47. Official Haison procedure has just been 
introduced with Eurolongterm, a Eurogroup 
committee responsible for tactical concepts. 
Burocom is. informed of studies conducted by 
FINABEL and the members of the independent 
European programme group, although having 
no official link with FINABEL, are aware of 
its existence and work. 
E. NATO 
48. AB Dr. Walter LaBerge 1 made clear in his 
address, "the established ·administrative machin-
ery of the Alliance offers general major assets 
which may be of an especial use to the European 
Community in its programme for co-ordinated 
armaments development". 
49. Dr. LaBerge cited three parts of the organ-
isational machinery of the Alliance which can 
be useful for the formulation of a European 
armaments policy. First, there are the staff 
specialists of the aLlied military commanders. 
Secondly, there are the civilian organisation and 
supporting staff. In this area the best known 
body is the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors which facilitates co-operation by an 
elaborate network of groups for the interchange 
of technical information or formation of projects. 
Thirdly, there exist under the Military Com-
mittee an international staff and certain agencies, 
such as the Military Agency for Standardisation 
(MAS). 
50. The Conference of NationaL Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) is the senior civil body under 
the North Atlantic Council concerned with 
defence equipment, and all NATO countries, 
including France, participate in its work. The 
CNAD has under it five groups of governmental 
representatives. These are the NATO Naval 
Armaments Group, the NATO Army Armaments 
I. NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence 
Support. 
Group, the NATO Air Force Armaments Group, 
the Defence R€Search Group and the Tri-Service 
Group on Air Defence. A sixth group, the Tri-
Service Group on Communications and Electronic 
Equipment, has been approved in principle by 
CNAD, but its exact scope and responsibilities 
have not yet been fuhly agreed. 
51. Under each of the CNAD main groups 
there are numerous specialist panels and sub-
groups. These working groups and panels have 
access to information from the United States and 
Canada. It is primarily through the mechanism 
of the CNAD bodies that this information 
becomes available to the European members. 
The CNAD working groups provide an effective 
two-way street in information between the Euro-
pean and American NATO countries. 
52. Likewise on the military side a body which 
facilitates the exchange of technioo.l information 
among Alliance nations is the Advisory Group 
for Aerospace Research and Development 
(AGARD). Also under the aegis of the Military 
Committee is the Military Agency for Standard-
isation (MAS) which issues Standardisation 
Agreements (STANAGs) on procedures, doc-
trines and equipment characteristics to provide 
interoperability or compatibility. Most ST ANAGs 
are €Stablished through MAS bodies although 
some of the work on equipment STANAGs 
originates in bodies under the CNAD. 
53. These STANAGs can in some cases provide 
a point of departure for the development of 
future armaments to be produced by European 
nations. 
54. As Dr. LaBerge pointed out "any policy for 
European armaments must undoubtedly recognise 
the value of the work of the MAS, and any 
multinational grouping of nations for co-
operative equipment projects must take results 
of its work into account". 
55. Lastly, there is one temporary activity 
which it is important to mention. The ad hoc 
Committeee on Equipment Interoperability was 
established by the NATO Ministers in December 
of 1975 and has now finished one year of opera-
tion. This body of political representatives of 
nations has brought strong pressure to bear for 
the solution of problems of interoperabidity in 
communications, fuels, tank gun ammunition, 
cross-servicing of aircraft and of the implementa-
tion of standardisation agreements. Furthermore, 
it has by its actions generated a generaL commit-
ment to interoperability which must surely form 
one of the bases for any European armaments 
policy. Dr. LaBerge's paper cited the following 
weapons projects under NATO CNAD aegis : 
Azores fixed acoustic range (AFAR) 
Mobile acoustic communications study (MACS) 
AN/USD-501 surveillance system 
FH-70 155 mm towed howitzer 
Puma, Gazelle and Lynx helicopters 
Jaguar tactical and training aircraft 
NATO maritime patrol aircraft 
Sea.sparrow point defence ship missile system 
Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (tracked) 
(VRT) 
:MK-20 RH-202 rapid-fire gun and anti-aircraft 
field mount HS-669N 
Mark 44 
Underwater acoustic com~unication system 
FORACS (fleet operational readiness accuracy 
check site) 
SP-70 (155 mm self-propelled howitzer) 
Milan PHM (NATO hydrofoil fast patrob ship 
guided missile) ' 
NATO frigate for the 1970s 
NATO conventionally-powered submarine for 
employment in European waters 
.Tornado multi-role combat aircraft 
F-16 air combat fighter 
Sea Gnat 
ll. Industrial arrangements 
Industrial aspects of European co-operation in 
weapons production 
56. The most striking feature of European 
industrial co-operation in armaments manu-
facture is in Mr. Greenwood's 1 words to the 
symposium "the quite remarkable variety of 
forms which international co-operation has 
taken". 
57. The position was well summarised in the 
action programme for the European aeronautical 
sector of the EEC : "the immense size of develop-
ment expenditure and the need for economies of 
scale in production have prompted the develop-
ment of a series of collaborative European 
projects ... ". . 
58. " ... The structures of this collaboration", the 
EEC Commission report continues, "have evolved 
and been most varied : from the agreement 
between separate companies on the Transall to 
the 'light' company (SEPECAT) set up' to 
develop the Anglo/French Jaguar, to the com-
mon development company to develop and pro-
duce the MRCA". 
59. The advantages and disadvantages of 
industrial co-operation were set out by 
Mr. Kuhlo 2 in his report to the symposium. He 
listed the advantages as: 
1. Chairman, British Aircraft Corporation. 
2. Head of Dynamics Division, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm GmbH. 
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(a) sharing of development cost ; 
(b) sharing of development risk ; 
(c) broadening of background : experience, 
capacity; 
(d) reduction of procurement cost : larger 
quantity and cadence ; 
(e) advantage in logistics and readiness 
to act, 
and the disadvantages as : 
( i) co-ordination of different national 
regulations, standards and procedures; 
,(ii) only partial activation of industrial 
potential. 
60. Mr. Kuhlo cites the cost and complexity 
of modern precision-guided munitions such as 
missiles, rockets, projectiles and bombs together 
with the importance of maximum standardisation 
in their development among inventories of the 
armed forces of the Alliance as arguments for 
co-operation in their development, production 
and use. 
61. Collaboration in this field, once very much 
ad hoc as between Engins Matra and Hawker 
Siddeley Dynamics over the Martel Missile, is 
now more institutionalised. 
62. The Euromissile organisation and adminis-
trative structure between the German MBB and 
French SNIAS companies created on the founda-
tion of the BPF A and DFPB (respective sponsor-
ing ministries) for the development and produc-
tion of the Millan, HOT and Roland missile 
systems was given by Mr. Kuhlo as an example 
of the kind of joint industrial/ministerial organ-
isation required in this high technology area. 
(See Diagram 1) 
63. It is noteworthy that in the space field not 
only is there a supranational European Space 
Agency (ESA) but also that the satisfactory 
work of the three international consortia MESH, 
COSMOS and STAR has shown, as the General 
Rapporteur Mr. Cristofini expLained in his 
summing-up of the symposium, that ''the 
extension of bilateral e..'tperience to multinational 
co-operation in consortia is not a figment of the 
imagination". Indeed, the General Rapporteur 
considered that "it is relatively easy to pass from 
the Euromissile-type of bilateral organisation to 
a COSMOS-type consortium". · 
64. Likewise in the military aerospace sector 
we have had a number of relatively straight-
forward industrial partnerships and collaborative 
arrangements to produce specific projects such as 
the Atlantic, Alpha-Jet, Transall, Puma, Lynx 
and Gazelle · helicopters and Jaguar. The 
SEPECAT organisation to manufacture the 
Jaguar (see Diagram 2) is typical of such ad hoc 
arrangements. 
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65. The Panavia joint industrial company 
between Aeritalia, BAC and MBB produce the 
multi-rOle Tornado aircraft with its corresponding 
joint engine company Turbo Union and attendant 
management agencies NAMMA/NAMMO repre-
sents the kind of industrial and official adminis-
trative collaborative evolution which could set the 
pattern for future joint weapon development and 
production in Europe. (See Diagram 3) 
66. It is just the type of successful military 
collaborative consortium which Mr. Greenwood 
warned the symposium should not be broken up 
when its own particular programme is completed. 
He advised the addition of further partners to 
such consortia and the assignment to them of 
additional programmes as they occur. 
67. It is difficult to quantify the cost effects 
of collaboration. However, it seems that by 
doubling the market due to collaboration, a 
saving on the mean unit cost in the order of 
20% is achieved on a major military aircraft 
programme. On smaller projects, the saving 
might be about 10 % per unit. These figures are 
based on estimates for national bilateral program-
mes in which although the total development bill 
in collaboration is one and a half times that of 
the unilateral bill, each sponsoring government 
has to find only two-thirds of the money required 
to do the job on its own. At the same time, a 
5% increase in manufacturing costs arises from 
the difficulties of geographical distance, language 
difference and so on 1 • In its next report the 
Committee will seek to include more recent 
figu~. 
68. Yet as the EEC action programme for 
aerospace pointed out "this healthy evolution 
(towards collaboration) has been marred by 
weakness ; by lack of systematic collaboration on 
procurement at European level ; by lack of pool-
ing of the basic research infrastructure ; by the 
fact that industrial production structures and 
development capabilities have not yet been fully 
rationalised to render them capable of exploiting 
the European dimension ; above all perhaps by a 
failure of basic political strategy in the 1960s." 2 
69. The result has been that following the 
withdrawal of France from the Anglo-French 
variable geometry aircraft, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom combined to build the Tor-
nado multi-role combat aircraft, leaving France 
a non-participant in Europe's important military 
project. In. the strike/trainer field, the Alpha-Jet 
I. See Sir George Edwards, OM, CBE, FRS, "Partner-
ship in major technological projects", 7th Maurice Lubbock 
Memorial Lecture - 14th May 1970, Oxford University 
Pre!ll!, pages 23-24. 
2. EEC Commission - Action programme for the 
aeronautica.l sector, Com. 75 (475), page 9. 
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and Hawk 1 are in direct competition in export 
markets as are the Anglo-French Jaguar and the 
purely French Mirage F-1 although the French 
Dassault-Breguet company is engaged in the 
manufacture of both F-1 and Jaguar. 
70. It is scarcely surprising that such divisions 
of interest and the consequent lack of any 
genuinely European alternative to the United 
States F-16 allowed the replacement order for 
th·e F-104s of Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Nor-
wegian air forces to go to the General Dynamics 
F-16 fighter rather than to a European aero-
plane. 
71. Nevertheless, there is no reason, given the 
necessary political determination on the part of 
the European members of the Alliance, for them 
not to be able to fulfil most of their requirements 
for defence equipment. 
72. While American military research and 
development expenditure dwarfs that of its 
European NATO partners, the gap, as Richard 
Burt points out 2, is narrowing. Whereas between 
1955 and 1965 the combined military research 
and development spending of Britain, France 
and Germany was 10 % of the American total, 
by 1970-74 this proportion had reached 27 %-
73. Moreover, Richard Burt argues that "the 
research and development gap should not obscure 
the fact in several areas such as anti-tank guided 
weapons (ATGW), low-level surface-to-air guided 
missiles (SAMs), anti-shipping missiles and 
target-acquisition aids - advanced systems are 
undergoing development and deployment by 
Europeans". 
74. In listing all the joint European program-
mes in which France alone was involved Inge-
nieur General Cauchie demonstrated the range 
and capability of Europe's armaments industries. 
If to these are added the weapons syst'elllS listed 
in Appendix II to WEU Document 689 (Report 
of the Committee on European and Atlantic 
co-operation in the field of armaments of 1st 
December 1975), it will be seen how exception-
ally technologically advanced the European 
industries are and how wide-ranging are their 
capabilities. 
75 It is not surprising that in a number of 
areas (V/Stol aircraft, low-level SAMs and ship-
borne guided weapons in particular) European 
weapons outperform those of the United States, 
and in a global context today European equip-
ment accounts according to Ingenieur General 
Cauchie for some 12 % of the market. 
I. A British basic and advanced jet trainer with close 
support capability. 
2. New weapons technologies- debate and directions 
by Richard Burt, !ISS Adelphi Paper No. 126, London, 
1976, pages 20-21. 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (1) 
Belgium ..•......•..••••..• Million Fra. 
France ..........••.•...•.• Million Fra. 
Federal Republic of Germany Million DM 
Italy ...........•...•.••.• Million Lire 
Luxembourg ...........•.•. Million Fra. 
Netherlands ...........•.•. Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ....••....• Million £ 
TOTAL WEU ·•·····• 
Canada Million $ 
Denmark.:::::::::::::::::: Million Kr. 
Greece Million Drachmas 
Norway • : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : Million Kr. 
Portugal .................. Million Escudos 
Turkey •.....•............ Million L. 
United States ............. Million $ 
TOTAL NON-WEU b •• 
TOTAL NATO b •••.•. 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1972-76 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices Defence expenditure (US $ million) a GDP in purchasere' ve.lues (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasere' values a 
1972 1973 1974 
(-5) (-4) (-3) 
44,140 48,941 57,395 
37,992 42,284 47,705 
28,720 31,908 35,644 
2,162 2,392 2,852 
517 601 710 
4,974 5,465 6,254 
3,258 3,512 4,160 
2,238 2,405 2,862 
3,386 3,520 4,439 
17,211 19,866 24,126 
3,239 3,505 3,938 
16,046 16,736 25,108 
9,961 12,192 15,831 
77,639 78,358 85,906 
1975 1976 t 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 t 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 e 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 e 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 ej 
------(-2) (-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
--------
69,936 79,445 1,003 1,258 1,474 1,902 2,058 35,462 45,604 53,409 62,250 67,193 9,711 9,742 9,772 9,801 9,830 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 
55,955 64,100 7,435 9,460 9,908 13,055 13,411 191,998 249,293 265,353 335,721 346,948 51,703 52,130 52,490 52,743 53,218 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 
37,589 38,823 8,912 11,928 13,775 15,267 15,418 258,984 346,983 386,342 424,653 453,377 59,599 59,923 60,021 59,822 59,330 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 
3,104 3,526 3,705 4,106 4,391 4,756 4,237 118,367 140,998 152,780 172,113 164,862 54,411 54,913 55,413 55,812 56,258 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 
836 900 12 15 18 23 23 1,359 1,869 2,184 2,197 2,289 348 353 357 359 363 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
7,246 7,713 1,535 1,954 2,324 2,865 2,917 45,287 60,093 69,536 81,197 88,289 13,329 13,439 13,545 13,654 13,791 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 
5,165 6,188 8,146 8,611 9,736 11,476 11,177 156,923 175,955 190,989 228,785 215,090 55,882 56,021 56,053 56,042 56,154 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.2 
--------
30,748 37,338 41,626 49,344 49,241 808,380 1,020,795 1,120,593 1,306,916 1,338,048 244,983 246,521 247,651 248,233 248,944 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 
--------I 
3,127 3,595 2,259 2,403 2,926 3,075 3,646 106,434 123,447 149,185 159,681 189,363 21,848 22,125 22,479 22,831 23,128 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 
5,281 5,974 487 582 728 918 988 20,934 27,289 30,220 35,428 38,206 4,992 5,022 5,045 5,060 5,090 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.6 
43,917 . . 574 670 804 1,363 . . 12,488 16,159 19,173 21,015 24,626 8,889 8,929 8,962 9,046 9,082 4.6 4.1 4.2 6.5 . . 
4,771 5,220 491 602 713 910 957 14,897 19,129 23,344 28,216 30,625 3,933 3,961 3,985 4,007 4,035 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 
19,898 18,500 589 651 985 780 612 8,469 10,907 13,268 14,647 14,575 8,590 8,557 8,890 9,449 10,044 7.0 6.0 7.4 5.3 4.2 
. . . . 718 870 1,140 . . . . 16,509 20,931 29,047 35,511 39,616 37,146 38,094 39,066 40,063 41,105 4.3 4.2 3.9 . . . . 
90,948 99,083 77,639 78,358 85,906 90,948 99,083 1,168,180 1,301,490 1,407,210 1,517,660 1,692,950 208,846 210,410 2ll,901 213,540 215,462 6.6 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.9 
--------
81,465 82,596 91,258 96,631 105,286 1,318,914 1,482,262 1,623,227 1,755,632 1,965,719 248,209 250,075 252,300 254,887 257,759 6.2 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 
-- -------
112,213 119,934 132,884 145,975 154,527 2,127,294 2,503,057 2,743,820 3,062,548 3,363,767 493,192 496,596 499,951 503,120 506,703 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Note a: GDP a.nd defence expenditures are calculated m nat10ne.l currency a.nd converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) a.nd (21) to (30) are affected by 
cha.nge .in exchange rates a.nd are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
convere10n. 
Previous tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Co=ittoo have used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wee.lth. In line with the practice of other international 
orga.niiiBtions, the tables are now given in torms of GDP which is somewhat higher tha.n GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
For the period 1972-76, the following rates of excha.nge have been applied: 
Country Unit US $ per unit UnitB per US $ Country Unit US $ per unit UnitB per US $ 
Belgium & Luxembourg Fra.nc Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1972 0.02272 44.01 
- 1972 1.71347 0.58361 
- 1973 0.02571 38.90 
- 1973 1.71649 0.58258 
- 1974 0.02567 38.95 
- 1974 1.53952 0.64955 
- 1975 0.02719 36.78 
- 1975 1.53183 0.65282 
- 1976 0.02590 38.60 
- 1976 1.20151 0.83229 
Canada Canadian Dollar Netherlanda Guilder 
- 1972 1.00943 0.99066 
- 1972 0.30864 3.24 
- 1973 0.99945 1.00055 
- 1973 0.35746 2.80 
- 1974 1.02248 0.97802 
- 1974 0.37163 2.69 
- 1975 0.98313 1.01716 
- 1975 0.39539 2.53 
- 1976 1.01416 0.98604 
- 1976 0.37822 2.64 
Denmark D. Kroner Norway 
- 1972 0.14390 6.9495 
- 1972 
- 1973 0.16523 6.0622 
- 1973 
- 1974 0.16408 6.0947 
- 1974 
- 1975 0.17392 5.7499 
- 1975 
- 1976 0.16543 6.0450 
- 1976 
N. Kroner 
0.15168 6.59 
0.17169 5.82 
0.18106 5.52 
0.19073 5.24 
0.18327 5.46 
France Franc Partugal 
-1972 0.19570 5.110 
- 1973 0.22387 4.467 - 1972 
- 1974 0.20770 4.815 - 1973 
- 1975 0.23331 4.286 - 1974, 1975 
- 1976 0.20922 4.780 - 1976 
Escudo 
0.03670 27.25 
0.03889 25.71 
0.03922 25.50 
0.03309 30.22 
Fed. Rep. of Germany Deutschmark Turkey T. Lira 
- 1972 0.31030 3.22 - 1972 0.07207 13.88 
- 1973 0.37383 2.68 - 1973 0.07133 14.02 
- 1974 0.38647 2.59 - 1974 0.07199 13.89 
- 1975 0.40616 2.46 -1975 0.06936 14.42 
- 1976 0.39714 2.52 - 1976 0.06249 16.00 
Greece Drachma United Kingdam 
- 1972 0.03333 30.00 
- 1972 2.5000 0.400 
- 1973 0.03373 29.65 
- 1973 2.4520 0.408 
- 1974 0.03333 30.00 
- 1974 2.3401 0.427 
- 1975 0.03103 32.23 
- 1975 2.2219 0.450 
- 1976 0.03017 33.15 
- 1976 1.8062 0.554 
Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece a.nd Turkey are not available for the most recent years; for purposes of comparieon all data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded 
throughout from Total non-WEU and Tote.! NATO. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
I = Forecast. 
GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purcha.sers' values, current prices. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release 11/DPC (2(76)18. 
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Defence expenditure per head a 
· Defence expenditure 118 % of tote.! WEU (US$) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 ef 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976/ 
--------(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
--------
103 129 151 194 209 3.26 3.37 3.54 3.86 4.18 
144 182 189 248 252 24.18 25.35 23.80 26.46 27.24 
150 199 230 255 260 28.99 31.95 33.10 30.95 31.31 
68 75 79 85 75 12.05 11.00 10.55 9.64 8.60 
34 42 51 64 63 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
115 145 172 210 212 4.99 5.23 6.68 5.81 5.92 
146 154 174 205 199 26.49 23.06 23.39 23.26 22.70 
--------
126 151 168 199 198 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
--------
103 109 130 135 158 7.35 6.44 7.03 6.23 7.40 
98 116 144 181 194 1.58 1.56 1.75 1.86 2.01 
65 75 90 151 . . 1.87 1.79 1.93 2.76 .. 
125 152 179 227 237 1.60 1.61 1.71 1.84 1.94 
69 76 112 83 61 1.92 1.74 2.37 1.58 1.24 
19 23 29 . . . . 2.34 2.33 2.74 . . .. 
372 372 405 426 460 252.50 209.86 206.38 184.31 201.22 
--------
328 330 362 379 408 . . . . . . .. . . 
--------
228 242 266 290 305 . . . . . . . . .. 
...... 
..... 
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UI. Institutional aspects of 
European co-operation 
A. Political problems of rationalisation 
76. The principal difficulty in arranging Euro-
pean armaments co-operation has always been 
the reconciliation of the institutional machinery 
for European armaments co-operation with the 
overall strategic necessity to preserve the Atlantic 
partnership. 
77. However, two and a half years after the 
publication for the United States State Depart-
ment of Thomas Callaghan's report on United 
States/European economic co-operation in military 
and civil technology, the "two-way street" it advo-
cated is as far away from realisation as ever. As 
Ing~nieur General Cauchie demonstrated, there 
is an imbalance in the United States' favour 
of approximately 10:1 between the United States' 
exports to and imports from Western Europe 
of defence equipment and in the case of France 
the ratio is as high as 40:1. 
78. This imbalance in armament purchases is 
not for a lack of transatlantic dialogue. France, 
for example, although not now involved in the 
integrated military structure of NATO, partici-
pates in the consultations of the North Atlantic 
Council and the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors and at a working level there 
are numerous exchange agreements on research 
and development between France and the United 
States and Canada. 
79. So far the United States has persisted, both 
for strategic reasons and as a result of political 
and industrial pressure, in a policy of near 
autarchy in weapons procurement. The Buy 
American Act in the case of defence equipment 
protects the United States market to the level of 
50 % of domestic costs. In the rare instances in 
which the United States does purchase European 
equipment as in the case of the Roland guided 
weapon and A V8B Advanced Harrier V/Stol 
aircraft, agreements for manufacture under 
licence in the United States are demanded. 
80. Nevertheless, recent trends in the United 
States towards a policy of standardisation and 
joint production in NATO should be noted: 
(a) Legislation introduced in particular by 
Senators Culver and Nunn in 1975 and 1976 has 
led to legislation declaring it to be "the policy of 
the United States that equipment procured for 
the use of personnel of the armed forces of the 
United States stationed in Europe under the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be 
standardised or at least interoperable with equip-
ment of other members of NATO". The Defence 
Secretary is authorised, for the purpose of the 
Buy American Act, to certify that procurement 
from a domestic source is inconsistent with the 
public interest. Weapon systems developed pri-
marily for the NATO theatre shall conform to 
I~ 
a common NATO requirement ; the sense of Con-
gress is stated to be that expanded inter-allied 
procurement would be facilitated by more licen-
sing and co-production agreements if economies 
of scale are preserved ; finally, it is recognised 
that a two-way street in defence procurement can 
work only if Europe operates collectively, 
"accordingly the Congress encourages the govern-
ments of Europe to accelerate their present 
efforts to achieve European armaments collabora-
tion among all European members of the 
Alliance." 1 
(b) The United States Department of Defence 
Directive No. 2010.6 of 11th March 1977 on 
standardisation and interoperability of weapon 
systems and equipment within NATO lays down 
responsibilities for implementing the policy 
expressed in the legislation quoted above. 
(c) The compensation arrangements made under 
the F-16 programme are more satisfactory than 
those of previous joint production agreements. 
They will bring new technologies into the Euro-
pean factories concerned, and provide the four 
purchasing countries with approximately full 
compensation for the dollar value of the F-16 
contract. Limited production capability in some 
countries has sometimes made it difficult to 
arrange suitable participation in the shared pro-
duction scheme. 
81. However, the problems encountered with 
the proposed new German-United States battle 
tank show still enormous obstacles to be over-
com~ before a two-way street can be effective. 
The two-way street concept can be criticised, as 
Ingenieur General Cauchie did, but it has to be 
recognised that there is as yet no European basis 
for it, and political and industrial efforts to 
create one have met with little success. The F-16 
deal will perhaps speed up the political efforts. 
82. But transatlantic projects should not be held 
up until the European structures have been built 
and begun to operate satisfactorily. Certain areas 
where two-way co-operation is possible can 
already be defined, and could work, given the 
political will on each side of the Atlantic. But 
a two-way street that satisfies European aspira-
tions is still far off and depends on other factors 
besides the European capacity to build European 
structures that will work. 
83. In an ideal world the best institutional 
machinery in which to concert European efforts 
in the armaments field would be NATO or Euro-
group, since the benefits of interoperability, 
standardisation, collaborative or joint production 
could be achieved on the basis of agreed tactical 
doctrines, but French participation is essential. 
I. United States military procurement authorisation 
bill 1977. Public Law 94-361, sections 802, 803. 
84. In the view of French spokesmen, progress 
towards co-operation in the field of armaments 
and hence towards a more effective European 
defence effort depends upon an institutional 
basis which, as Mr. Cristofini observed, respects 
"relevant national interests" and whose proceed-
ings can, as Ingenieur General Cauchie remarked, 
be "conducted on pragmatic and flexible lines, 
with no hard and fast structure and no cumber-
some and sterilising mechanisms". 
85. It was against this background that the 
independent European programme group (IEPG) 
was established. To quote Ingenieur General 
Cauchie again: "it means that in the group we 
find. ourselves among fellow Europeans untraD?--
melled by the familiar official structures, whether 
of NATO or WEU". 
86. Hitherto the plethora of institutions have, 
in the field of European armaments procurement 
and co-operation, done scant justice in their 
achievements to the good intentions of their 
founders. In the instance of the IEPG, the pro-
liferation of agencies and institutions must be 
no obstacle to real progress as the IEPG must 
work eclectically taking care to avoid duplicating 
the efforts of other bodies but utilising the results 
of their work where appropriate. 
87. For example, liaison with NATO is auto-
matically assured through the co-membership of 
NATO of the participants in the IEPG. In this 
way a close relationship between armaments 
projects and military operational needs should 
be even more surely achieved. 
88. Also the lack of industrial participation 
in the IEPG to date can be offset to some extent 
if, as Ingenieur General Cauchie suggests, the 
IEPG follows up the interest of France in 
ensuring that the IEPG utilises the c:urrent 
study of the Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU. into the present state of the European 
armaments industries. 
89. In this connection, and in view of French 
support for WEU which is after all the only all-
Western European political forum purely devot-
ed to defence questions, the Standing Armaments 
Committee could be given an enhanced role as an 
expert study centre. At present the Standing 
Armaments Committee is responsible to the 
Council of WEU only. Its studies should be 
systematically utilised by the IEPG. To extend 
a degree of parliamentary scrutiny to the IEPG, 
consideration could be given to having the latter 
submit an annual report to the WEU Assembly. 
90. Furthermore, if the Standing Armaments 
Committee had this wider role, it could under-
take studies on behalf of the Assembly in the 
field of weapon procurement and collaboration 
which could not only satisfy current political 
demands but also be of benefit perhaps to the 
IEPG. 
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91. In conclusion, it should also be noted that 
industry is showing increasing interest in the 
IEPG. Your Rapporteur nevertheless agrees 
with the conclusion of the IEPG that a European 
Defence Industry Group or any similar industrial 
body should not participate fully in the work 
of the IEPG. But industrial observers at selected 
sub-group meetings should not be ruled out. 
92. . The multiplicity of existing agencies and 
institutions has been a subject of frequent 
adverse comment and long held to be a brake 
upon real progress to European armaments co-
operation. Furthermore, as eventual European 
union edges very gradually nearer to reality, it 
seems in the words of Mr. van der Stoel, Nether-
lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the WEU 
Assembly of June 1976 " ... to be a logical sequel 
... that ultimately defence too should be a matter 
for the union". 1 
93. "Although", as Mr. Destremau, French 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also 
rightly observed on the same occasion, "in sound 
logic there cannot be a unified European opera-
tional defence without there being a unified 
European political power, there is no reason 
why, to save time, we should not conceptualise 
here and now the conditions for establishing such 
a defence. In this area and until such time as 
the strategic concept takes shape, the setting up 
of a programme group for the standardisation 
of armaments designed and manufactured by 
Europeans might prove the desired trigger for 
developing a European armaments industry. In 
the same prospect may be viewed the Council of 
Ministers' remit to the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU to conduct an in-depth 
survey of our countries' armaments industries. 
This is being done at Belgium's instigation firmly 
backed by ourselves. Moreover it was your 
Assembly which, on a report I had the honour 
to submit to it on 8th November 1972, advocated 
reactivating the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee". e 
94. In developing a truly European armaments 
industry, there is a marked dichotomy between 
those agencies concerned with the industrial 
aspects and those concerned with the purely 
military. 
95. In view of the success of the IEPG to date, 
the time has surely come for overdue rationalisa-
tion of their functions. In particular, as the 
IEPG is· now successfully established and con-
cerns itself primarily with the harmonisation of 
operational requirements, FINABEL's functions 
as regards army equipment and logistics might 
1. Official Report, Sixth Sitting, 17th June 1976, 
page 193. 
2. Official Report, Second Sitting, 15th June lli76, 
page 86. 
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come . to be assumed by the IEPG which. could 
form any extra sub-committees as required. 
96. · Both the IEPG and FINABEL are speci-
fically European bodies without any of the 
political disadvantages in French eyes of the 
NATO agencies or even Eurogroup and its sub-
committees 1 • Indeed France is an active parti-
cipant in both the IEPG and FINABEL. 
97. A drawing together of FINABEL and the 
IEPG would have the further advantage that 
FINABEL, unlike the IEPG, maintains close 
liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee 
of WEU. . 
B. lnteroperability and standardisation 
98. The Eurogroup communique issued at The 
Hague on 5th November 1975 stressed that "in 
order to make better use of the limited defence 
resources available within the North Atlantic 
Alliance, it is of the greatest importance to 
increase the interoperability and standardisation 
of military equipment within the Alliance while 
maintaining an effective and viable European 
defence industry". 
99. There is no doubt of the military need for 
both interoperability and standardisation. In a 
lecture· to the Royal United Services Institute 
for Defence Studies in London on 22nd October 
1975, Dr: Gardiner C. Tuck'er, the Assistant 
Secretary-General of NATO for Defence Sup-
port, cited the example of the ACE Mobile 
Force 2 • ".There are seven nations who contribute 
units to that force ... it has seven types of combat 
aircraft. It has six different types of recoilless 
rifles ... four different types of wire-guided anti-
tank . miSsiles, three different types of mortars, 
three. different rifles and three different 
machine-guns ... seven logistic trains must be 
established." · 
100. Even more horrifyingly, Dr. Tucker related 
how, in a recent naval exercise, of over fifty 
NATO aircraft shot down over 50% were credi-
ted to NATO armaments owing to the impos-
sibility of intercommunication with ground or 
ship borne air interception control systems 3 • The 
current lack of harmonisation of equipments is 
indeed fratricidal in not only the economic sense. 
101. The United States on the one hand tends to 
emphasise standardisation. The French on the 
other stress the paramount importance of inter-
operability. Ingenieur General Cauchie · in his 
paper weritso far as to suggest that the ultimate . 
logic of standardisation is monopoly and special-
1. Cf. WEU Document 689, European and Atlantic 
co-operation in the field of arman1ents -minority opinion 
presented by Mr. Riviere, paragraphs 8.3(ii) and 8.3(1/i) (a). 
2. See R.U.S.I. Journal- March 1976, page 8. 
3. Op.· cit. page 9. 
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isation, probably on a national basis, with all the 
economic and even social disadvantages which 
could ensue. 
102. Certainly Thomas Callaghan is right to 
point out that the military and logistic ineffi-
ciencies of the present situation seriously degrade 
the operational capabilities of the Alliance. "In 
varying degrees", he writes, "neither the land, 
nor the sea nor the air forces of NATO can 
operate effectively together for any significant 
period of time" 1 and he goes on to cite the 
multiplicity of logistic support systems. 
103. "The weakest link", Callaghan continues, 
"in the entire allied defence chain is thus this 
NATO vulnerability to sustained conventional 
attack by Warsaw Pact forces. There should be 
no such vulnerability. There is no lack of 
resources. Over $90 billion per year is spent on 
general purpose forces : over 70 % of the Ameri-
can defence budget ; over 80 % of our European 
allies' defence budget". 
104. In the short term, interoperability is the 
first essential as far as existing weapon systems 
are concerned. For example, at least the Jaguars 
of the Armee de l'Air and RAF should be made 
as genuinely as possible interoperable as should 
the Phantoms of the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAF 
and the Tornados in British, German and Italian 
air force service. These initiatives should be 
extended across the spectrum of army and naval 
armaments as well. 
105. In the longer term Calhighan's European 
defence procurement agency (in fact the IEPG) 
should be tasked with a functional assessment 
of Europe's defence equipment requirements. 
Rationalisation of procurement, and, wherever 
possible, of production to assure standardisation 
would have major industrial and economic reper-
cussions, but : 
· (a) we have to contain the explosion of 
defence cost - interoperability can be 
very expensive ; 
(b) from the military operational point of 
view the advantages are great. 
IV. Industrial aspects of European 
defence procurer.nent 
106. The · General Rapporteur, Mr. Cristofini, 
laid down four guidelines for success in Euro-
pean industrial armaments policy. First, the ins-
titutional framework had to be sound to ensure 
that relevant national interests were preserved 
(to which the Italian contributors to the sympo-
sium so eloquently referred) while working out 
1. See Survival - IISS London - May /June 1975, 
page 130. 
joint industrial programmes. Secondly, profit-
ability had to be ensured in co-operative projects. 
Mr. Greenwood suggested in this regard that 
"common commercial identity of purpose" was 
necessary. Thirdly, a' degree of protection had 
to be introduced at least in the early stages and 
fourthly, resources had to be adequate to bring 
Europe nearer to the level of the major powers 
in this field. 
107. Flexibility would be essential in applying 
these policies. For example, there would have to 
be "weighting" in favour of the smaller nations 
in the allocation of armament work packages. The 
forms of industrial co-operation might vary from 
simple subcontracting in some instances to the_ 
formation of transnational companies like 
Panavia in others. 
108. Europe should aim to establish itself in a 
position of approximate parity with the United 
States, even in the most modern weapons. A 
degree of pooling of resources for research would 
help in this respect 88 is occurring through the 
EEC for civil aerospace but overall an element 
of "competition" in research is healthy. 
109. There is no reason why a determined effort 
on .the part of the Europeans to build up their 
continent's indigenous capability to provide for 
its own defence equipment should preclude the 
purchase of American armaments. However, the 
establishment of Thomas Callaghan's "Common 
market for Atlantic defence" or former Defence 
Secretary Schlesinger's "two-way street" is a 
longer-term project. 
Conclusions 
110. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation. 
111. The Committee sees no economic or indus-
trial reason why Western Europe should not 
provide for the greater part of its defence equip-
ment within its own resources, provided the poli-
tical willpower exists and adequate finance is 
made available. Technologically Europe is capable 
of manufacturing the latest conventional weapons 
such 88 precision-guided anti-tank and short- and 
medium-range anti-aircraft missiles. In areas of 
specific weakness the existing facilities for the 
exchange of technical information with the 
United States will continue to be of value. 
112. But to keep abreast of the growing and 
technologically more sophisticated Soviet defence 
production effort, and to compensate for the 
increasing cost of future generations of weapons 
systems, it will be essential for the European 
countries to reap the economic advantages which 
ensue from the longer production runs of jointly-
produced standardised equipment. While the 
Committee is aware that some at least of the 
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military advantages of standardisation may be 
achieved by ensuring that different weapons 
systems are interoperable, it does not believe that 
interoperability alone is a sufficient objective for· 
European armaments co-operation. 
113. While stressing the need for standardisa-
tion, the Committee does not overlook the innov-
ative advantages of some competitive research 
and development. Within Europe, however, a 
concerted effort must be :inade to reduce com-· 
peting research and development· to a maximum 
of two concepts for any weapons system, and to 
ensure that one only is selected for advanced 
development and production before vested indus-
trial interest in conflicting systems can arise. 
114. The Committee welcomes recent indications 
of an increasing desire on the part of the United 
States to seek standardisation of equipment in 
the Alliance. It believes however that first 
priority must be given to ensuring the main-
tenance of a viable European production basis. 
115. The Committee stresses the need for more 
parliamentary control over the whole defence 
procurement process. It is itself fitted by the 
terpJ.s of the Brussels Treaty to play such a rOle 
at the European level until such time 88 the 
inclusion of statutory defence functions in the 
powers of the European Community makes it 
appropriate for the European Parliament to 
assume that role. 
116. The Committee further recommends that 
the institutional basis of European defence pro-
duction co-operation be streamlined, firstly by 
concentrating on the independent European 
programme group. At the same time, it is essen-
tial that the military characteristics of equipment . 
continue to be discussed and determined within 
NATO, as it is within the framework of the 
military command structure of the Alliance that 
weapons would have to be used if a conflict broke 
out. 
117. Lastly, the Committee seeks precise inform-.· 
ation from the Council concerning the terms of 
reference for the study of the European defence 
industry entrusted to the Standing Armaments 
Committee. In a future report the Committee 
hopes to pursue the suggestion that the Standing 
Armaments Committee should be further devel-
oped as an expert study centre for the whole 
defence procurement process. Such an important 
new function for the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee would avoid the problems of duplication 
which, in the past, have inhibited member govern-
ments from making proper use of it. Thus the 
Standing Armaments Committee could be avail-
able to produce studies at the request of the 
IEPG, and, for this purpose, its staff could be 
enlarged through the recruitment of experts, · 
including nationals of those IEPG countries 
which are not members of WEU. The Standing 
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Armaments Committee could also be available to 
prepare specific studies at the request of the 
Assembly or its bodies - it is pointed out in 
this connection that, unlike the staff of the 
European Parliament, or of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Office 
of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly has no study 
and research staff, apart from its very limited 
committee ·services. 
Opinion of the minority 
118. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. In 
the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation a minority of the Committee 
would have replaced the words "... makes it 
urgent ... joint production ;" with the words 
"makes it nece8sary for the European countries 
of the Alliance to secure the advantages of 
standardisation through joint production in the 
fields where it is justified from the operational, 
economic and political standpoint" on the 
grounds that standardisation is a difficult, long-
term objective, its advantage being established 
in certa~n specific sectors only. For the same 
re'ason paragraph 1 of the operative text would 
have been reworded by deleting "first priority" 
for standardisation in sub-paragraph (a) and 
deleting the whole of sub-paragraph (b). 
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119. In the third paragraph of the preamble the 
minority would have deleted the words "until 
the European Parliament is invested by statute 
with defence functions", claiming that defence 
was a purely national re-Sponsibility, not to be 
delegated to supranational authority, and that 
a European defence policy could arise solely 
from concertation between States. 
120. In the fourth paragraph of the p:r:eamble, 
the minority would have added at the end the 
words "but stressing the need for balanced and 
mutually-advantageous concessions" with a view 
to stressing the need for Europe not to be reduced 
to a rOle of supplier of low-technology arma-
ments. 
121. Lastly the minority would have replaced 
paragraph 2 of the operative text with the 
words: "Ensure good co-ordination of the work 
of the Standing Armaments Committee with that 
of the independent European programme 
group", because it held that common European 
weapons characteristics should be determined 
outside NATO, and that the Council had assigned 
an ii.nportant role to the Standing Armaments 
Committee in approving on 26th April the terms 
of reference of a study of the European arma-
ments industry which it is to carry out. -
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